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ABSTRACT
Serge Severenchuk: Effects of Partisan Identity and Partisan Stereotypes on Evaluations
(Under direction of Thomas M. Carsey)
While previous research shows that party cues can affect evaluations outside the expressly
political realm, we do not know the causal mechanism for this phenomenon. It could be that
partisanship as a social identity affects evaluations, or it could be that partisan stereotypes
are responsible for bias in evaluations. By drawing from literature on party identification,
social identity, and trait ownership theory, this research examines this causal mechanism.
Furthermore, while previous literature has examined how partisan identity and stereotypes
bias evaluations, how both of these factors bias evaluations at the same time has not been
previously examined. Studying partisan bias is important because these factors have the
potential to affect the distribution of resources for ordinary, non-elected individuals on a
mass-scale. To carry out this examination, I conducted a survey experiment on college
students in the Southeastern United States. While the small sample size in this survey
limits the ability to find statistically significant results, I do find some support for my theory.
Namely, I find some evidence that partisan identity biases people’s evaluations. I also find
some suggestive evidence that stereotypes can, at times, off-set or reinforce the bias from
partisan identity on evaluations.
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Introduction
Previous literature shows that party cues can affect evaluations of people and objects
outside the expressly political realm (Carsey, Banda and Severenchuk n.d.). However, we do
not know the causal mechanism behind this phenomena. It could be that partisanship as
a social identity biases evaluations. Alternatively, party cues could serve as a heuristic for
partisan stereotypes that could be affecting evaluations. While previous research examined
the impact of partisan identity and partisan stereotypes on evaluations of people (Campbell
et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Jerit, Kuklinski and Quirk 2009; Iyengar,
Sood and Lelkes 2012; Phillips and Carsey 2013; Rahn 1993; Kinder 1986; Greene 2001;
Newman 2003, 2004; Kelleher and Wolak 2006; McAvoy 2008), how evaluations are affected
when exposed to bias from these two factors at the same time, has not been previously
examined. Such an exploration is important, for politics in general deals with distribution
of resources. If partisanship as a social identity and partisan stereotypes (or both at the
same time) bias evaluations of people in a substantively meaningful way, then we have a
psychological mechanism that affects the distribution of resources on a mass-scale.
Trait ownership theory asserts that regardless of their partisanship, people associate
some positive traits with Democrats and others with Republicans (Hayes 2005). In other
words, there are some positive stereotypes for Democrats and Republicans. When it comes
to partisanship, in line with previous research on partisanship and social identity, we expect
people to favorably bias their evaluations when their partisanship matches the partisanship
of the person they are evaluating, and negatively when it does not match the person they
are evaluating.
Bring together social identity theory and positive partisan stereotypes reveals that in
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some cases the bias from these two forces might reinforce each other, and in other cases it
might not. In this paper I develop a theory about how people’s evaluations are biased by these
two forces in different scenarios. To test this theory, I conduct a survey experiment on college
students in the Southeastern United States. In this study I experimentally mimic situations
that individuals encounter in everyday life. This allows me to compare the direction and
magnitude of bias when evaluations are expected to be biased by partisan identity, partisan
stereotypes, or both at the same time. While the small sample size in my survey limits
my ability to get statistically significant results, most of my findings are consistent with my
theoretical expectations. Namely, I find some evidence for the in-group favoritism hypothesis.
I also find some evidence that, in some situations, people experience cross-pressures from
their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes. Moreover, although there are some mixed
findings, I also find some suggestive evidence that at times the bias from partisan stereotypes
can either offset or reinforce the bias from partisan identity.
Effect of Partisanship on Evaluations
Partisanship affects the attitudes and behaviors of citizens in a variety of ways. For in-
stance, partisanship influences political attitudes, policy, and candidate evaluations (Leeper
and Slothuus 2014; Jerit, Kuklinski and Quirk 2009). It also remains one of the best predic-
tors of vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002).
There are two major schools of thought regarding partisanship. The ‘Michigan model,’
which falls into a social-psychological perspective, and the ‘tally model,’ which mostly fits
into a rational choice perspective. The two approaches have different conceptions of why
and to what extent partisanship should bias evaluations in the political arena.
The Michigan model, first proposed by Campbell and his colleagues, views partisanship as
a psychological attachment to one’s own party. It stresses the affective nature of partisanship,
and predicts that partisanship is pervasive in it’s influence on, perceptions of, and reactions
to the political world (Campbell et al. 1960). An alternative perspective, first proposed by
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Fiorina became known as the ‘tally model.’ This approach views partisanship as a sum
of political assessments, and argues that citizens make prospective choices by considering
retrospective evaluations (Achen 1992; Fiorina 1977; Zechman 1979)
While in the ‘tally model’ citizens make rational decisions, in the ‘Michigan model’ their
decisions are heavily shaped by the psychological bond to their party (Fiorina 1977; Campbell
et al. 1960). Hence, the Michigan school offers a perspective that predicts that partisanship
will shape evaluations beyond rational assessments by the voters (Campbell et al. 1960;
Bartels 2002a). This social-psychological approach was later revised by Green et al., who
conceptualize of partisanship as a type of social identity. From this perspective individuals
have a partisan social identity, which is expected to influence evaluations of candidates and
the political world around them (Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002).
Social identity theory predicts that when individuals categorize themselves as the in-
group and others as the out-group, we should observe in-group favoritism in evaluations
(Allport 1954; Brewer 1999; Struch and Schwartz 1989; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Transue
2007; De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999; Dovidio and Gaertner 2000). Empirical research shows
that the categories of groups do not have to be meaningful for in-group favoritism to occur
(Tajfel 1970). Categorizing oneself into the in-group and others into the out-group does not
always lead to out-group bias (Struch and Schwartz 1989; Brewer 1999). However, under the
conditions of the U.S. two-party system–competition, negative feelings towards opponents,
and feelings of moral superiority over the other party, we should observe out-group bias
(Brewer 2001; Doosje et al. 1998; Mackie and Smith 1998; Mummendey and Otten 2001).
Effect of Partisan Stereotypes on Evaluations
Stereotypes are commonly defined as people’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about
a group (Hamilton and Trolier 1986). Just like with many other groups, people have concep-
tions of what partisans are like. That is, they have stereotypes of partisans (Green, Palmquist
and Schickler 2002; Hayes 2005). For instance, in 1997 a survey presented respondents with
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words and asked them to select the ones that describe Democrats and Republicans. For
Democrats, 40 percent of respondents picked “middle class,” and “minorities.” For Republi-
cans, 55 percent of respondents selected “big business,” and 52 percent selected “rich people”
(Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). When the partisanship of a candidate is known, it
can function as a heuristic for partisan stereotypes, which in turn can affect evaluations
(Arceneaux 2008; Rahn 1993).
A number of studies show that perception of personality traits affects evaluations (Bartels
2002b; Rahn 1993; Kinder 1986; Greene 2001; Newman 2003, 2004; Kelleher and Wolak 2006;
McAvoy 2008). Iyengar et al. (2012) found that the tendency of partisans to stereotype
each other on traits has increased in recent decades. The authors found that from 1960
to 2010 the likelihood of Democrats and Republicans associating negative traits with the
opposing party and positive traits with their own has increased by about 50% (Iyengar,
Sood and Lelkes 2012). Some of these personality traits have been shown to be associated
with Democrats, while others with Republicans (Hayes 2005). In particular, by applying
the logic of Petroick’s (1996) issue ownership theory to traits, Hayes proposes a theory
of trait ownership. The author shows that some traits are ‘owned’ by Republicans, while
others by Democrats (Hayes 2005; Petrocik 1996).1 What is particularly interesting about
Hayes’ work is that people (irrespective of their party identification) hold some positive
stereotypes about both Republicans and Democrats. One of Hayes’ strongest findings is
that Republicans are perceived to be strong leaders, while Democrats are perceived to be
empathetic and compassionate (Hayes 2005).
Effect of Partisan Identity and Partisan Stereotypes on Evaluations
Previous literature shows that partisan identity (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Campbell
et al. 1960; Jerit, Kuklinski and Quirk 2009; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002), and
partisan stereotypes (Arceneaux 2008; Rahn 1993; Hayes 2005) can bias evaluations. How-
1Not all traits are owned by one of the two parties.
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ever, how evaluations are affected when exposed to both of these forces at the same time
has not been previously examined. Moreover, while previous research shows that partisan
cues can affect evaluations of non-political events and objects, we do not know the causal
mechanism behind party cues biasing evaluations(Carsey, Banda and Severenchuk n.d.). It
could be that partisanship as a social identity is biasing evaluations via in-group favoritism.
Alternatively, partisan stereotypes could be affecting evaluations. By looking at conditions
where we would expect the influence of one, or both of these forces at the same time, this
research furthers our understanding the mechanism through which partisan cues can bias
people’s assessments.
Since this research is concerned with both the effects of partisanship as social identity and
partisan stereotypes on evaluations, by necessity I have to look at evaluations of people (as
opposed to evaluations of objects). This is simply because partisan stereotypes are about,
and hence only apply to people. In order to evaluate the effects of partisanship as a social
identity, I follow previous research in taking the examination outside the expressly political
realm, for it helps to isolate different functions of partisanship (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes
2012; Phillips and Carsey 2013; Carsey, Banda and Severenchuk n.d.). Consequently, this
research examines how partisan identity and partisan stereotypes affect evaluations of people
outside of the political realm.
The increasing partisan polarization in the U.S. in recent decades has led to an affective
polarization between partisans (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012). Klar and Krupnikov (2016)
in their exploration of independents, find that this polarization has lead some people to avoid
identifying as partisans or engaging in behavior that could betray their partisan attitudes.
Instead an increasing number of Americans choose to identify as independents (Klar and
Krupnikov 2016). As the authors argue, people’s need to make a positive impression on
others is driving them to abandon partisan identification or publicly partisan behavior (Klar
and Krupnikov 2016). The authors’ experiments show that exposing partisans to news
clippings depicting partisan polarization increases likelihood that a person will identify as
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an independent (Klar and Krupnikov 2016).2 If partisans are aware of the increasingly
negative feelings towards members of the opposing party, and that partisan labels can bias
assessments of individuals, then Klar and Krupnikov’s (2016) findings of individuals choosing
to identify as independents can be interpreted as strategic behavior to avoid negative bias
on their evaluations by members of the opposing party.
While individuals with partisan preferences might, at times, avoid revealing their parti-
sanship, in cases when their partisanship is known, their evaluations can be biased via a party
heuristic, either by partisan identity of the evaluator or partisan stereotypes. An important
caveat to the previous statement is that a person’s partisanship does not have to be correctly
identified for them to be subject to partisan bias. Their partisanship can be mis-identified,
but as long as the person doing the evaluation thinks that they ‘know’ the partisanship of
the person they are evaluating, the evaluation should be biased by partisan identity of the
evaluator, and has the potential to be subject to bias from partisan stereotypes.
For a person to be subject to bias from partisan stereotypes, three conditions must hold.
First, their partisanship should be identified, second the stereotype needs to be relevant to
the evaluation at hand, and third, stereotype needs to be owned by the party of the person
being evaluated. For instance, imagine that there is a stereotype that Democrats are good
at math. If we are evaluating potential tutors, for a Democrat to benefit from this positive
stereotype we would first need to know their partisanship. If on the other hand we are
evaluating chefs, the stereotype of Democrats being good at math should have no impact
on our evaluations of chefs. Going back to an example of evaluating tutors, if in the course
of the interview we find out that our candidate is Republican, this should not change our
evaluations of the candidate. This is because finding out that they are Republican (unlike
finding out that they are Democrat in this example) does not provide the evaluator with
any extra information in regards to math ability of this candidate. We would not expect the
2In these experiments those who switched from identifying as partisans to identifying as inde-
pendents (after being exposed to news clippings highlighting partisan polarization) did not show a
change in policy preferences or interest in politics.
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Republican candidate to be punished, unless there is a negative stereotype of Republicans
being bad at math. In which case, a candidate’s partisanship would provide an evaluator
with relevant negative information about the candidate’s math ability.
From the findings of Hayes (2005) we know that people hold some positive stereotypes
of both Democrats and Republicans. Hence, we should have situations where, regardless of
one’s partisanship, these stereotypes should be exerting a positive bias on evaluations. More-
over, from the literature on partisanship and social identity, we know that one’s partisanship
should affect evaluations positively when a person’s party identification matches that of the
person they are evaluating, and in the negative direction when it does not (Allport 1954;
Brewer 1999, 2001; Campbell et al. 1960; De Cremer and Van Vugt 1999; Dovidio and Gaert-
ner 2000; Doosje et al. 1998; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Mackie and Smith 1998;
Mummendey and Otten 2001; Struch and Schwartz 1989; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Transue
2007).
These propositions can be stated more formally as the following set of hypotheses:
H1: When partisanship of the evaluator matches the partisanship of the person they are
evaluating, partisan identity should bias evaluations in the positive direction.
H2: When partisanship of the evaluator does not match the partisanship of the person they
are evaluating, partisan identity should bias evaluations in the negative direction.
The first hypothesis is consistent with predictions of social identity theory, and is sometimes
referred to as in-group favoritism hypotheses. The second hypothesis, as mentioned, is what
we could observe under the conditions of the two party system in the U.S. It is sometimes
referred to as out-group bias hypothesis.
When an individual knows the partisanship of the person they are evaluating they can
find themselves in a variety of situations. There are times when the bias from partisan
identity and partisan stereotype should reinforce each other. This should be the case when
partisanship of the individual doing the evaluation and the person being evaluated match.
For example, if a Republican respondent is evaluating a Republican individual and leadership
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is a relevant trait to this evaluation, we would expect both the individual’s partisan identity
and partisan stereotype to reinforce each other and bias evaluations in a positive direction
(in comparison to the baseline). Other times, bias from the partisan identity and partisan
stereotypes should be at cross-pressures with each other. Specifically, this should be the
case when the positive stereotype is owned by the party of the person being evaluated and
partisanship of the that person and the individual doing evaluation do not match. In such
an scenario we would expect partisan identity of the evaluator to bias evaluations in the
negative direction, and partisan stereotype to bias evaluation in the positive direction. For
example, if a Democratic respondent is evaluating a Republican individual in a scenario
where leadership as a trait is relevant to the evaluation at hand, then partisan identity of
the respondent should be biasing the evaluation in the negative direction, and the positive
stereotype of Republicans being strong leaders should be affecting evaluations in a positive
direction (Hayes 2005). Finally, if partisan stereotype is not relevant to the situation, or if
the subject being evaluated is not of the same party that owns the positive stereotype, then
the evaluation of this person should only be biased by partisan identity.
These propositions have a number of testable empirical implications. Namely, in terms
of magnitude of bias we should observe the following:
H3a: When bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other, the
magnitude of bias should be bigger than the magnitude of bias when evaluations are biased
only by partisan identity.
H3b: When bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other, the
magnitude of bias should be bigger than the magnitude of bias when evaluations are at
cross-pressures with each other.
H4a: When subjects experience cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan
stereotypes, the magnitude of bias in their evaluations should be smaller than the magnitude
of bias when their evaluations are biased by partisan stereotypes and partisan identity in the
same direction.
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H4b: When subjects experience cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan
stereotypes, the magnitude of bias in their evaluations should be smaller than the magnitude
of bias when their evaluations are biased only by partisan identity.
In, summary in terms of magnitude of the bias, we should observe the following:
Bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other > bias from partisan
identity > bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes at cross-pressures.
As hypotheses 3 and 4 imply, the bias from positive partisan stereotypes should always
bias evaluation in the positive direction. This is because (under conditions when we would
expect partisan stereotypes to bias evaluations) positive stereotypes provide the evaluator
with relevant positive information about a subject that causes them to bias their evaluations
in the positive direction.
Furthermore, if subjects experience significant cross-pressures in their evaluations, we
would expect them to experience cognitive conflict. Hence, they should take longer to an-
swer the evaluation questions than subjects that do not experience cross-pressures in their
evaluations. Stated more formally:
H5: Subjects that are expected to experience significant cross-pressures should take, on aver-
age, longer to answer evaluation questions than subjects that are not expected to experience
cross-pressures.
Bias on Evaluations for Independents
Previous literature shows that independent leaners, at least when it comes to partisan
preferences, behave much in the same way as partisans do (Keith et al. 1992; Klar and
Krupnikov 2016).3 Hence, we can expect partisan identity and partisan stereotypes to bias
evaluations in a similar manner for leaners and partisans. When it comes to ‘pure indepen-
dents’, that is, independents that do not lean either towards Republicans or Democrats, the
3Individuals who identify as independent, but admit to lean towards either a Democratic or
Republican party.
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story is a bit more nuanced.
If pure independents simply lack a partisan identity, then we would not expect them to
react to partisan cues. The reasoning is straightforward. Partisans bias evaluations because
they identify with their group (which is expected to cause in-group favoritism and out-group
bias) (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). If pure independents
do not identify with their group, then they would not be expected to engage in in-group
favoritism or out-group bias. Which brings us to the next hypothesis.
H6: If pure independents lack a partisan identity, their evaluations should not be affected
by partisan cues.
On the other hand, ‘independent’ could also constitute a meaningful political identity of
its own. There is some suggestive evidence that this might be the case. For instance, Klar
(2014), has found that for partisans, strength of ideological identification predicts political
engagement. The same is not true for independents. Instead, political engagement of inde-
pendents can be predicted by the importance of their identity as an independent to them.
This finding led the author to assert that ’independent’ is a meaningful political identity
(Klar 2014). Furthermore, there is also evidence that suggests that independents dislike par-
tisan polarization (Klar and Krupnikov 2016). Hence, if pure independents actually identify
with their group (as opposed to simply lacking an identification with the two parties), we
would expect them to translate their negative feelings about polarization and competition
with Democrats and Republicans into negative bias against these out-groups. That is, we
would expect pure independents to bias their evaluations negatively when they are exposed
to either Republican or Democratic party cues. Stated more formally:
H7: If pure independents have a meaningful political identity, exposure to partisan cues
should result in negative bias in their evaluations.
Regardless of whether pure independents have a meaningful political identity, we would
expect their evaluations to be affected by the stereotype heuristic. That is, if pure inde-
pendents are exposed situations where an individual being evaluated is from the same party
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that owns the positive stereotype (assuming the stereotype is relevant to the situation), then
they should bias their evaluations positively, in comparison to cases when they do not know
the partisanship of the person they are evaluating. Going back to the earlier example, if
pure independents are evaluating a Republican individual and leadership is relevant to the
evaluation, then the observed bias should be indicative of the effects of partisan stereotypes
on evaluations. Which brings us to the next hypothesis.
H8: When a positive partisan stereotype is relevant to the evaluation, pure independents
should bias their evaluations in a positive direction.
Study Design
To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study conducts a survey experiment on col-
lege students in the Southeastern United States. I am interested in examining how partisan
identity and partisan stereotypes bias evaluations. As discussed above, in day-to-day life,
individuals can find themselves in a variety of situations. At times their evaluations are sub-
ject only to bias from partisan identity, or partisan stereotypes (when a pure independent is
doing the evaluation). At other times, their evaluations are biased by both forces, either in
the same, or in the opposite directions.
To examine how partisan stereotypes and partisan identity bias evaluations, I place re-
spondents in plausible experimental conditions that mimic each of these situations. While in
the real-world a variety of partisan stereotypes exist, currently one of the strongest findings
for partisan stereotypes that individuals share regardless of their partisanship is that Re-
publicans are good leaders and Democrats are empathetic and compassionate (Hayes 2005).
Consequently, examining these stereotypes serves as a natural starting point for exploration
of how partisan stereotypes bias evaluations in general. In order to make these stereotypes
relevant to the evaluation at hand, I had respondents evaluate a business manager and a nurs-
ing professional. These professions were chosen because leadership and empathy/compassion
should be relevant traits to these professions, respectively.
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1st 2nd 3nd
Mean
Ranking
Ordered
Rank
Business Manager
Leadership 54.5 17.9 13.8 2.00 1
(0.13)
Empathy/ Compassion 1.6 4.9 7.3 5.92 7
(0.17)
Knowledge 4.1 17.1 21.1 4.31 4
(0.18)
Intelligence 11.4 21.1 13.8 3.80 3
(0.18)
Decency 0.8 4.9 4.9 5.99 8
(0.16)
Morality 4.9 3.3 12.2 5.30 6
(0.18)
Ability to Inspire 4.1 14.6 13.0 4.88 5
(0.19)
Competence 18.7 16.3 13.8 3.76 2
(0.19)
Nursing Professional
Leadership 0.8 1.6 5.6 6.40 7
(0.15)
Empathy/ Compassion 27.2 22.4 16.0 2.98 2
(0.17)
Knowledge 30.4 24.8 19.2 2.80 1
(0.17)
Intelligence 12.8 20.8 22.4 3.46 3
(0.15)
Decency 1.6 3.2 12.0 5.55 6
(0.15)
Morality 7.2 5.6 10.4 4.66 5
(0.16)
Ability to Inspire 0.0 4.8 3.2 6.58 8
(0.15)
Competence 20.0 16.8 11.2 3.55 4
(0.18)
Note: After removing missing cases the sample size, n, for a nursing professional is 125 and
the sample size for a business manager is 123. The first three columns report a percentage of
respondents ranking a particular trait in either 1st, 2nd, or 3rd place. The forth column gives
mean ranking with standard errors for these means in parentheses. The last column gives the
overall rank-order of a trait.
Table 1: Ranking of Traits in the Order of Importance for a Business Manager
and a Nursing Professional
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To determine whether the assumption that leadership is relevant to evaluations of a
business manager, and empathy/compassion are relevant to the evaluations of a nursing
professional is reasonable, I presented respondents with eight traits and asked to rank them
in the order of importance. Results for both a business manager and a nursing professional
are presented in Table 7. The first three columns show a percentage of respondents placing
the relevant trait in that place. The fourth column shows mean ranking, with standard errors
for these means in parentheses (lower rankings indicate that the trait is more important).
The last column rank orders traits, with the trait that was ranked by respondents as most
important in the first place, and the trait that was ranked as least important in relative
terms, in the 8th place.
When it comes to a business manager, 86.2 percent of respondents place leadership be-
tween first and third most important trait. The mean ranking for leadership is 2. This makes
it, on average, the most important trait for the business manager (as indicated by the last
column in the table). Therefore, we can assert that from the perspective of respondents,
leadership is clearly a relevant trait to the evaluation of a business manager.
When it comes to a nursing professional, 65.6 percent of respondents ranked empa-
thy/compassion somewhere between first and third most important trait. The mean ranking
for this trait is 2.98. Considering that respondents rated these traits on a scale ranging
from 1st and 8th place, this is still a relatively high ranking. Overall, empathy/compassion
is ranked as the second most important trait (as shown in the last column of Table 7).
Hence, we can conclude that from the perspective of the respondents, empathy/compassion
are relevant to the evaluation of a nursing professional.
After answering some demographic questions about themselves respondents were assigned
at random to either a control group, a Democratic cue, or Republican cue condition. Re-
spondents assigned to the control group, were asked to evaluate a business manager and a
nursing professional without being given a partisan cue. This serves as a baseline. Respon-
dents assigned to either a Democratic or a Republican party cue, evaluated Democratic or
13
Control Group Democratic Cue Republican Cue
Ind S +
Dem PID + S +, PID −
Rep PID − S+, PID +
Table 2: Expected Sources of Bias in Evaluations of a Busi-
ness Manager
Control Group Democratic Cue Republican Cue
Ind S +
Dem S +, PID + PID −
Rep S +, PID − PID +
Table 3: Expected Sources of Bias in Evaluations of a Nurs-
ing Professional
Note: In Table 2 and 3 “PID” represents bias from partisan identity, “S”
represents bias from a partisan stereotype. The symbol “+” indicates that
bias is expected to be in the positive direction, and “-” indicates that bias
is expected to be in the negative direction.
Republican professionals for both prompts. Table 2 and 3 show the sources of bias that eval-
uations of a business manager, and a nursing professional should be exposed to, respectively.
The table is broken down by experimental condition, represented by columns, and partisan-
ship, represented by rows. Since previous literature shows that independent leaners behave in
much the same way as partisans do Keith et al. (1992); Klar and Krupnikov (2016), they are
included in either the Democratic or Republican category, respectively. Bias stemming from
partisanship identity of the respondent is represented by “PID” and bias stemming from the
partisan stereotype is represented by the symbol “S.” Whether evaluations should be biased
in the positive or negative direction is represented by “+” and “-” symbols respectively.
As can be seen in Table 2 and 3 evaluations of pure independents (assuming they lack a
political identity), should only be biased by partisan stereotypes. In particular, their eval-
uations should be biased when they are evaluating a Republican business manager, and a
Democratic nursing professional.4 Furthermore, as shown in Table 2 Democrats and Re-
4As discussed in the section “Bias on Evaluations for Independents,” it is possible that inde-
pendents have a meaningful political identity of their own, instead of simply lacking one. Whether
14
publicans should be exposed to bias only from their partisan identity when evaluating a
Democratic business manager. When evaluating a Republican business manager, the evalu-
ations of Democrats should be biased by both partisan identity and partisan stereotypes, but
in opposite directions. When Republicans are evaluating a Republican business manager,
their evaluations should be biased by both forces in the positive direction.
When it comes to evaluations of a Republican nursing professional (see Table 3), Democrats
and Republicans should only bias their evaluations due to their partisan identity. When
evaluating a Democratic nursing professional, partisan stereotype of Democrats being empa-
thetic/compassionate is relevant. Hence, the evaluations of Democrats should be biased in
the positive direction by both their partisan identity and the stereotype heuristic, while the
evaluations of Republican respondents should be biased in the negative direction because of
their partisan identity, but in the positive direction because of the stereotype heuristic.
In terms of experimental prompts, in the first scenario respondents were asked to imagine
that they were selected to help choose a business manager who will manage their company
or department. They were presented with a profile of a reasonably qualified individual with
prior management experience. For instance, the following is a prompt was received by those
assigned to the Republican cue condition.
“Mark Smith graduated from a state college with an economics degree and
3.3 GPA. In college Mark was a member of College Republicans and was actively
involved in several other student organizations. He currently holds a management
position where he is directly responsible for overseeing about 20 workers. Mark
has about 3 years of management experience. He moved to the area about 2
years ago with his wife and daughter Mary.”
For the Democratic cue condition, “College Republicans” was replaced with “College
they do or do not is an empirical question. If “independent” represents a meaningful political
identity, then we should observe a negative bias in evaluations of a Democratic business leader, and
a Republican nursing professional (H7). Since, most of the literature asserts that pure indepen-
dents lack political identity, and Klar’s (2014) assertions to the contrary are mostly speculative, for
simplicity sake, predictions for pure independents in Table 2 and 3 assume that pure independents
lack a meaningful political identity.
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Democrats”, and control group omitted that party, and simply stated that “in college Mark
was actively involved in several student organizations.” While in the prompt respondents are
revealed that Mark was a Democrat or a Republican in college, since they are not given any
information to the contrary, respondents are very likely to infer that Mark is still a Democrat
or a Republican, respectively.
After reading the previous prompt, respondents were asked to answer four evaluation
questions. Two of them were indicative of behavioral intent: 1) “How likely would you be to
select Mark to manage your company or department?” 2) “If Mark is not selected by the com-
mittee, how likely are you to recommend him for another business management position?”
The other two questions had to do with the affect towards that individual: 1) “How com-
fortable would you be with someone like Mark managing your company or department?” 2)
“How enjoyable do you think you will find Mark working in your company or department?”
Since there is some concern for priming effects from earlier presented questions on latter
questions, these questions were presented in a randomized order. Responses to all questions
were measured on a 5-point scale, randing from “very likely” to “very unlikely,” from “very
comfortable” to “very uncomfortable,” or from “very enjoyable” to “very unenjoyable”.
After the business manager scenario, respondents were asked to imagine that they have
been asked to help choose nursing professional that will work in their community. The
following is a prompt that respondents in the Democratic cue condition received.
“Joe Stevens has recently finished nursing school and received his RN (regis-
tered nurse) license. While pursuing his studies, Joe has worked in a hospital as
a CNA (certified nursing assistant) for 3 years. Joe’s supervisors at the hospital
generally have a good opinion about him. He moved to the area a couple of years
ago with his wife and daughter Holly. On his free time Joe coaches high-school
soccer, and volunteers at the local Democratic party.”
In a similar manner to the experimental treatment in the first scenario, for Republican
cue condition, the phrase “local Democratic party” was replaced with “local Republican
party,” and the control group excluded mention of Joe’s partisanship and simply stated that
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“On his free time Joe coaches high-school soccer.” After reading this prompt, respondents
were asked to answer four questions that mirrored the questions presented in the business
manager scenario. The questions were measured on the same scale and randomized in the
order which they were presented, just like in the first scenario.
It’s noteworthy that gender was kept constant for both prompts. This was done in or-
der to keep gender from interfering with the results. Since business manager and a nursing
professional are professions that are gendered (stereotypes of these professions are tied to
gender), not specifying gender would have likely resulted in a considerable portion of re-
spondents (if not the majority) in assuming that the business manager was male, while the
nursing professional was female.5 This would result in evaluations being affected by gender
stereotypes in addition to partisan identity and partisan stereotypes.
While explicitly including male names in the prompt keeps the gender constant, respon-
dents might view male nursing professional as less empathetic/compassionate (in comparison
to a female nursing professional). A similar effect is likely to be observed if the business
manager was female. That is, respondents might have viewed her as lower on a leadership
scale than a male counterpart. All this should do, however, is lower the average baseline
evaluation. That is, to the extent that a male nursing professional is viewed as less em-
pathetic/compassionate than a female counterpart, the average evaluations in the control
group should be lowered. However, the only thing changing from control to experimental
conditions is whether party cue of a professional is specified (which serves as a heuristic
for partisanship and partisan stereotypes). Hence, the previously hypothesized effects of
partisan identity and partisan stereotypes on evaluations should still be observed.
After respondents answered questions for both scenarios, a robustness check was per-
formed to assess whether respondents in the sample hold partisan stereotypes that we expect
them to hold based on prior literature. Respondents were asked to think about Republicans
5This assertion is supported by previous research, which shows that when information is omitted,
people tend to “fill-in” the details in congruence with their expectations (Gilliam Jr. and Iyengar
2000).
17
and Democrats and asked how well a certain trait describes them. A total of six traits were
examined (including leadership, and empathy/compassion). Answers were recorded on a
5-point scale, randing from “extremely well” to “not very well at all.”
This robustness check is necessary because previous research examining partisan stereo-
types examines them by looking at elected officials (Hayes 2005). There is a chance that these
stereotypes only apply to elites, and are not relevant to evaluations of ordinary non-elected
individuals. Alternatively, it could be that the sample used in this study (college students
in introductory political science course) are not representative of the national population in
terms of the partisan stereotypes that they hold.
Whether respondents are asked to evaluate Republicans or Democrats on these traits
first can affect answers to their evaluations of who they evaluate second. Thus, respondents
were randomly assigned the order in which they evaluated Republicans and Democrats. The
six traits on which respondents evaluated Republicans and Democrats were also presented
to respondents in a random order.
The decision of whether to place this robustness check before or after the main experiment
involves some trade-offs. Conducting it at the end risks the possibility that some of the
results observed in it will be due to priming in the main experiment. However, conducting
the robustness check before the main experiment, risks contaminating the results of the
main experiment. Since I am primarily concerned with measuring the relative size of bias of
partisan identity and stereotypes, as well how these two forces bias evaluations together, I
decided to conduct this robustness check after the main experiment.
Results
As previously mentioned the survey was conducted on college students in an introduc-
tory political science course in Southeastern United States. The sample size for the survey,
n= 136, is small by conventional standards. The main analysis for the evaluation questions
is broken down by experimental condition (either a control group, or one of the partisan cue
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conditions), and partisanship of the respondent. This further divides the sample size into
smaller subgroups that are used for analysis, and affects the ability to get statistically signif-
icant results. Moreover, although we have meaningful expectations for pure independents,
there was a very small number of them in the sample, n= 3. Hence, they are excluded from
the following analysis.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict the direction of the bias for partisan identity. Hypotheses
3 and 4 predict the magnitude of the bias when partisan identity and partisan stereotypes
reinforce each-other, when they are at cross-pressures with each-other, and when evaluations
are only subject to bias from partisan identity. Figures 1-4 present results that test these
hypotheses. These figures show mean responses to the evaluation questions, broken down by
experimental condition and partisanship.6 The set of columns on the left represents responses
in the control group, the set of bars in the middle represents responses in the Democratic
cue condition, and the set of bars on the right represents responses in the Republican cue
condition. The dark gray bars signify responses for Republican respondents, and the light
gray bars signify responses for Democratic respondents. Responses to the four evaluation
questions were recorded on a 5-point scale. They were from 0 to 4, so that 4 represents
“very likely,” “very comfortable,” and “very enjoyable” responses, while 0 represents “very
unlikely,” “very uncomfortable,” and “very unenjoyable” responses.
Figure 1 presents results for the behavioral intent questions for the business manager
scenario. In particular, the subfigure on the left presents results for the likelihood of selecting
the business manager, and the subfigure on the right presents results for the likelihood of
recommending a business manager if they are not selected by the committee. Figure 2
presents results for the affect questions for the business manager scenario. Specifically, the
subfigure on the left presents results for the level of comfort question, while the subfigure on
the right presents results to the enjoyment question.
6* In the bar charts signifies statistically significant difference from the control group at p < .01
level.
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In-group favoritism hypothesis, H1, states that respondents should bias their evaluations
in the positive direction when evaluating a fellow partisan. In figure 1 and 2 we should
observe results for H1 when looking at Democratic respondents’ evaluations of a Democratic
business manager. For these questions respondents do appear to be engaging in in-group
favoritism. However, results only reach conventional levels of significance for the likelihood
of recommending, and level of enjoyment questions (when results are significant at p < .01
level). Hence, we find some support for in-group favoritism hypothesis, H1.
Furthermore, I hypothesized that when partisanship of the person doing evaluations and
the person being evaluated do not match, evaluations will be biased in the negative direction
(out-group bias hypothesis, H2). We should observe results for this hypothesis in figure 1 and
2 when looking at Republican respondents’ evaluations of a Democratic business manager.
Although results are not statistically significant, at no point do respondents appear to be
biasing their evaluations in the negative direction. Hence, we do not find any support for
hypothesis 2.
Hypotheses 3a and 3b made predictions about the magnitude of bias when bias from
partisan identity and partisan stereotypes reinforce each other. In particular, in these cases
we expected the magnitude of bias to be bigger than when respondents are expected to
experience cross-pressures from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes, or when
their evaluations are only biased by their partisan identity. In figure 1 and 2 these two
forces are hypothesized to reinforce each other when Republican respondents are evaluating
a Republican business manager. Although in general, Republicans appear to be biasing
their evaluations favorably from control group, the magnitude of the bias is not the biggest
as predicted by hypotheses 3a and 3b. In fact, the magnitude of bias appears to be bigger
when partisans are only biased by their partisan identity (in this case when Democrats are
evaluating a fellow Democratic business manager). Furthermore, the magnitude of bias is
not consistently bigger in comparison to cases when respondents should be experiencing
cross-pressures. Once again these results are not statistically significant, so we can not
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tell whether respondents’ evaluations when they are expected to experience bias from their
partisan identity and partisan stereotypes in the same direction are different from their
evaluations in the control group. Hence, we can not support hypotheses 3a and 3b.
Hypotheses 4a and 4b predicted the magnitude of bias when the bias from partisan
identity and partisan stereotypes were expected to be at cross-pressures. Specifically, we
expected the bias in this case to be smaller in comparison to times when respondents’ evalu-
ations were only biased by partisan identity or when their evaluations are biased by partisan
identity and partisan stereotypes in the same direction. In figure 1 and 2 we should observe
results for these hypotheses when looking at Democratic respondents evaluating a Repub-
lican business manager. No consistent results appear from the figures. For instance, for
the likelihood of recommending and level of enjoyment questions, the bias appears to be
smaller when respondents are hypothesized to experience cross-pressures, than when biases
from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes are expected to reinforce each other. For
the other two questions (likelihood of selection, and comfort level) the magnitude of bias
when respondents are expected to experience cross-pressures is bigger than when the biases
from their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes are expected to reinforce each other.
While results appear to be mixed for these hypotheses, they fail to reach conventional levels
of significance. Thus, we can not support hypotheses 4a and 4b.
Figure 3 and 4 present results for behavioral intent and affect questions for a nursing
professional scenario. In particular, in Figure 3, subfigure on the left presents results for the
likelihood of selecting a nursing professional question, and subfigure on the right presents
results for likelihood of recommending a nursing professional. In figure 4, the subfigure on
the left presents results for the level of comfort question, and the subfigure on the right
presents results for the level of enjoyment question.
In regards to H1, while partisans appear to be biasing their evaluations favorably when
evaluating fellow partisans, for the exception of selecting a nursing professional question
(significant at p < .01 level), results fail to reach conventional levels of significance. This can
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Figure 1: Mean Responses to Behavioral Intent Questions for Business Manager
Scenario
Note: In figure 1, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and
dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for
each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically
significant difference from the control group at p < .01 level.
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Figure 2: Mean Responses to Affect Questions for Business Manager Scenario
Note: In figure 2, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and
dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for
each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically
significant difference from the control group at p < .01 level.
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be seen in figure 3 and 4 by looking at Republican respondents’ evaluations of a Republican
nursing professional. Hence, in evaluations of a nursing professional scenario we find some
support for hypothesis 1.
Similarly to the business manager scenario, we do not find support for out-group bias
hypothesis (H2). In figure 3 and 4, this can be seen by looking at evaluations of Democratic
respondents of a Republican nursing professional. Hypotheses 3a and 3b made predictions
about the magnitude of bias when the bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes
is expected to reinforce each other. In the figures we observe results for these hypotheses by
looking at Democratic respondents evaluating a Democratic nursing professional. Consistent
with our predictions, the magnitude of bias is the biggest, except for the likelihood of selecting
a nursing professional question. However, results are only statistically significant (at p < .01
level) for the level of comfort question. Hence, when looking at evaluations of a nursing
professional, we find some support for hypotheses 3a and 3b.
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Figure 3: Mean Responses to Behavioral Intent Questions for Nursing Profes-
sional Scenario
Note: In figure 3, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and
dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for
each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically
significant difference from the control group at p < .01 level.
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Figure 4: Mean Responses to Affect Questions for Nursing Professional Scenario
Note: In figure 4, light gray bars represent mean responses for Democratic respondents and
dark gray bars represent mean responses for Republican respondents. The mean response for
each group of respondents is specified above the columns. In the figure * signifies statistically
significant difference from the control group at p < .01 level.
Hypotheses 4a and 4b predict the magnitude of bias for cases when bias from partisan
identity and partisan stereotypes are expected to be at cross-pressures with each other.
In figure 3 and 4, this should be observed when Republican respondents are evaluating a
Democratic nursing professional. Consistent with these predictions the magnitude of the
bias is the smallest for all four questions, although results are not statistically significant.
Hence, we can not support hypotheses 4a and 4b, but the results are consistent with these
hypotheses.
Next, I examine whether, under hypothesized conditions, respondents experienced sig-
nificant cross-pressures from the influence of their partisan identity and partisan stereotypes
by looking at the time it takes respondents to answer the evaluation questions. Hypothe-
sis 5 states that if respondents experience significant cross-pressures, they should take, on
average, longer to answer the evaluation questions than respondents who do not experience
cross-pressures.
Since there is a concern (especially with a small sample size) that the average length
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of response will be influenced by influential outliers (by both those who quickly record a
response to a question without taking it into consideration, and those who might have taken
breaks while taking the survey), I first remove 2.5 percent of the fastest and 2.5 percent
of the slowest responses to the four questions for each scenario. Table 4 shows descriptive
statistics for the timing data for both scenarios before and after the extreme values were
removed. Taking out 2.5 percent of the fastest and slowest responses reduced the timing
data by 8 observations in both scenarios. Specifically, the following values were removed
from the business manager scenario: 4.49, 5.58, 7.97, 9.39, 76.68, 77.72, 124.75, 195.36, and
the following values were removed from the nursing professional scenario: 4.07, 4.88, 5.26,
5.96, 108.47, 167.88, 225.02, 6875.72.
Scenario Min Median Mean Max SD
Before removing outliers
Business Manager 4.49 23.64 29.00 195.40 71.66
Nursing Professional 4.07 14.35 70.09 6876.00 2797.39
After removing outliers
Business Manager 9.50 23.64 26.91 72.74 22.08
Nursing Professional 6.32 14.35 16.68 69.47 23.22
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Timing Variables
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for timing variables for business manager
and nursing professional scenarios before and after the extreme values were removed.
After removing outliers, I calculated the average duration of time, in seconds, that it
took respondents to answer the four questions evaluating a business manager and a nursing
professional, respectively. Results are shown in tables 5 and 6. The standard errors for
these averages are included in the parentheses. The table is broken down by experimental
treatment and party identification of the respondent. To remind the reader in which condi-
tions we expect to see cross-pressures from partisan identity and partisan stereotype bias,
the table also indicates whether in a given case, evaluations will be biased by either partisan
identity or partisan stereotypes (this is presented in a similar manner as it was done in Table
2 and 3).
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Control Group Democratic Cue Republican Cue
Dem 26.95 (2.84) 28.01 (2.55) 32.13 (3.38)
PID+ S+, PID −
Rep 24.25 (1.88) 23.92 (1.67) 23.50 (2.07)
PID− S+, PID +
Table 5: Average Response Time in Seconds to Evaluation
Questions of a Business Manager
Control Group Democratic Cue Republican Cue
Dem 16.44 (1.28) 15.35 (1.24) 18.93 (1.60)
S +, PID + PID −
Rep 14.24 (.94) 18.85 (3.42) 16.53 (2.57)
S +, PID − PID +
Table 6: Average Response Time in Seconds to Evaluation
Questions of a Nursing Professional
Note: Table 4 and 5 show mean response time in seconds, along with
standard errors in the parentheses. To remind the reader in which cases
respondents are predicted to experience cross pressures, the tables also
include predicted sources of bias on evaluations. “PID” represents bias
from partisan identity, “S” represents bias from a partisan stereotype. The
symbol “+” indicates that bias is expected to be in the positive direction,
and “-” indicates that bias is expected to be in the negative direction.
When Democrats are evaluating a Republican business manager, they are hypothesized
to experience cross-pressures. As expected, in this condition they take longer to answer the
four questions, on average 32.13 seconds, in comparison to 26.95 seconds when they are in
the control group, and 28.01 seconds when they are exposed to only partisan identity bias
(though based on difference between means test, results do not reach conventional levels of
significance). Similarly, when Republicans are evaluating a Democratic nursing professional,
they are hypothesized to experience cross-pressures. In line with these expectations, Re-
spondents take longer in this condition, taking an average of 18.85 seconds, in comparison to
16.53 seconds when they are exposed to bias only from their partisan identity, and 14.24 sec-
onds when they are not subject to bias from either partisan identity or stereotype heuristic
(that is, when they are in the control group). Once again, results do not reach conventional
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levels of significance.
We can get additional leverage by pooling timing results for both the business manager
and nursing professional scenario, and then comparing cases in which respondents are ex-
pected to experience cross-pressures with the cases in which respondents are not expected
to experience cross-pressures. Before we can do that, we have to account for the fact that
respondents took longer to answer the four evaluation questions in the business manager
scenario than similar questions in the nursing professional scenario. This is likely to be
caused by respondents receiving the business manager scenario in the survey first. Since
questions were similar for both scenarios, the shorter response times in the nursing profes-
sional scenario are likely due to respondents increased familiarity with the questions and
answer choices.
To account for the different baseline response times for the two scenarios, I first trans-
formed the timing variables (for the different scenarios shown in table 5 and 6) to be ex-
pressed as deviations from the mean response time in the relevant control group. I then
pooled the timing results for the business manager and the nursing professional scenarios
and compared response times for cases when respondents were expected to experience sig-
nificant cross-pressures with cases when they were not expected to experience significant
cross-pressures. Results are presented in Table 7. Note that hypothesis 5 predicted that
respondents will take longer when they experience cross-pressures, in comparison to cases
when they do not. Hence, this table breaks down scenarios in the experiment in a way that
directly tests hypothesis 5. Average length of time (when expressed as a deviation from the
mean response time in the control group) is 4.95 seconds when respondents are expected to
experience cross-pressures, in comparison to .36 seconds when respondents were not expected
to experience cross-pressures. Difference between means test shows that this difference is
statistically significant at p < .01 level. Thus, based on the results in Table 7 we can support
Hypothesis 5.
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Cross-Pressures (S+, P−) All Other Cases
4.95∗ .36
(2.41) (0.65)
Table 7: Average Deviations in Response Time to the Eval-
uation Questions in Both Scenarios
Note: This table shows average deviations in response time from mean time
in the relevant control group for cases where respondents are expected to
experience cross-pressures and cases when they are not expected to experi-
ence significant cross-pressures. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
In the table “*” signifies significant difference between means at p < .01
level.
Perception of Partisan Stereotypes in the Sample
As mentioned previously, this research checks whether respondents actually hold the
stereotypes that Republicans are good leaders and Democrats are empathetic and compas-
sionate. In this robustness check, respondents were asked how well a certain trait describes
Democrats or Republicans, on a 5-point scale ranging from “Extremely well” to “Not very
well at all.” Responses were reverse coded so that 4 represents “Extremely Well,” and 0
represents “Not very well at all.” Table 8 presents mean trait scores for Democrats and
Republicans. The columns for Democrats and Republicans show mean ratings, along with
standard errors in parentheses. Once again lower mean responses indicate that a trait de-
scribes Democrats or Republicans better. The column on the right shows the difference in
ratings for Democrats and Republicans. A significant and large difference signifies that a
particular trait is owned by the party that has a lower mean score on that trait.
First, it’s noteworthy that both Democrats and Republicans are rated favorably on lead-
ership and compassion/empathy. Mean responses range from 1.69 to 2.35. Responses of
2 indicated that a particular trait describes partisans “Moderately well” and response of 3
indicated that it described partisans “Very well.” Hence, none of the ratings indicate that
Democrats or Republicans completely lack a particular positive trait. That is, it seems
that neither Democrats nor Republicans are stereotyped negatively on these traits. Hence,
as aforementioned, evaluations of Democrats and Republicans should not be negatively bi-
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ased by partisan stereotypes when the other party is associated with a positive trait that is
relevant to the situation at hand.
Second, contrary to expectations, results consistently indicate better ratings for Democrats
on all traits. This is even true for traits like leadership and morality, which previous liter-
ature found to be owned by Republicans (Hayes 2005). These results reach conventional
levels of significance, except for the trait of “competence.”
Democrats Republicans Difference
Compassionate/
Empathetic
2.35 1.69 .66∗∗
(.09) (.10)
Competent 2.14 2.01 .13
(.08) (.09)
Good Leaders 2.21 1.93 .28∗
(.08) (.09)
Honest 1.96 1.66 .30∗
(.08) (.08)
Intelligent 2.33 2.04 .29∗
(.07) (.08)
Moral 2.22 1.85 .37∗∗
(.08) (.09)
Note: Table 8 shows mean trait scores for Democrats and Republicans
with standard errors for these means in parentheses. These means were
calculated from responses that ranged on a five-point scale from 0 to 4, with
higher numbers signifying more favorable rating. In the table * signifies
significance at p < .05 level and ** signifies significance at p < .01 level.
Sample size, n, is 136.
Table 8: Mean Personality Trait Scores for Democrats and
Republicans
Given the surprising nature of these results, I break down trait ratings for Democrats
and Republicans by respondents’ partisanship. This allows me to examine whether ratings
are driven by respondents assigning their party more favorable ratings, as opposed to both
Democrats and Republicans agreeing that members of a certain party own particular traits.
Hence, Table 9 presents mean ratings for the same traits in a similar format as Table 8, but
breaks it down by partisanship of a respondent.
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Democrats Republicans Difference
Compassionate/
Empathetic
Democratic respondent 2.93 1.12 1.81∗∗
(.09) (.11)
Republican respondent 1.43 2.61 1.18∗∗
(.11) (.12)
Difference 1.50∗∗ 1.49∗∗
Competent
Democratic respondent 2.40 1.67 .73∗∗
(.09) (.11)
Republican respondent 1.73 2.55 .82∗∗
(.12) (.12)
Difference .67∗∗ .88∗∗
Good Leaders
Democratic respondent 2.61 1.55 1.06∗∗
(.09) (.10)
Republican respondent 1.57 2.55 .98∗∗
(.10) (.11)
Difference 1.04∗∗ 1.00∗∗
Honest
Democratic respondent 2.22 1.39 .83∗∗
(.11) (.10)
Republican respondent 1.57 2.08 .51∗∗
(.09) (.13)
Difference .65∗∗ .69∗∗
Intelligent
Democratic respondent 2.55 1.73 .82∗∗
(.09) (.11)
Republican respondent 2.00 2.55 .55∗∗
(.11) (.12)
Difference .55∗∗ .82∗∗
Moral
Democratic respondent 2.54 1.48 1.06∗∗
(.11) (.12)
Republican respondent 1.71 2.43 .72∗∗
(.11) (.12)
Difference .83∗∗ .95∗∗
Note: Table 9 shows mean trait scores for Democrats and Republicans
with standard errors for these means in parentheses. The means are broken
down by partisanship of the respondent. These means were calculated from
responses that ranged on a five-point scale from 0 to 4, with higher numbers
signifying more favorable rating. In the table * signifies significance at p
< .05 level and ** signifies significance at p < .01 level. Sample size, n for
Democrats = 83, and n for Republicans = 50.
Table 9: Mean Personality Trait Scores for Democrats and
Republicans by Respondents’ Partisanship30
When we consider respondents’ partisanship, for all analyzed traits Democratic respon-
dents give more favorable ratings to Democrats, and Republican respondents give more
favorable ratings to Republicans. These results are statistically significant at conventional
levels of significance. Moreover, these findings are consistent with previous research that
shows that in the age of polarization, partisans are more likely to associate positive traits
with their own party, and negative traits with the party of the opponents (Iyengar, Sood
and Lelkes 2012). However, these results are inconsistent with trait ownership theory, which
predicts that respondents, regardless of their partisanship, should associate some traits with
Democrats and others with Republicans (Hayes 2005).
Consequently, from the results in Table 9 it seems that Democrats and Republicans in my
sample don’t hold the hypothesized stereotypes. That is, they don’t agree that Democrats or
Republicans own a particular positive trait, instead they simply assign more positive ratings
to members of their own party. Since the evaluation questions (behavioral intent and affect
questions) are also broken down by partisanship of the respondent, the perception of traits
in Table 9 should be driving respondents’ evaluations in the experiment. This could be one
of the reasons for lack of findings for stereotype bias discussed earlier.
Furthermore, the seeming incongruity in the results shown in Table 9, which show that
partisans assign favorable ratings to their party, and those in Table 8, which show that
Democrats receive favorable ratings for all the traits, is due to the discrepancy in the number
of Democrats and Republicans in the sample. More specifically, while the sample has 83
Democrats (including partisan leaners), it has only 50 Republicans (also including leaners).
Hence, because ratings of Democrats are weighted heavier in the overall mean, the overall
mean ratings are skewed in the direction of Democratic respondents.
Conclusion/Discussion
This research conducted a survey experiment in order to examine how stereotypes and
partisan identity bias evaluations of ordinary people. It mimicked situations that people
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might encounter in the real-world, and placed respondents in scenarios where their evalua-
tions were predicted to be biased by their partisan identity and stereotypes, either in the
same or opposite directions. In other scenarios, their evaluations were only expected to be
biased by partisan identity.
While the survey’s small sample size, n= 136, affected my ability to get statistically
significant results, I did find some support for my theory. In particular, I found statistically
significant support for in-group favoritism hypothesis (though results are not statistically
significant in each case when we expect to observe in-group favoritism). This is consistent
with prior findings of social identity theory and partisanship as social identity literature.
Moreover, there is some suggestive evidence (mostly when looking at the nursing professional)
that bias from partisan identity and partisan stereotypes can, at times, reinforce each other,
and at other times offset each other (though results most of the time fail to reach conventional
levels of significance).
Furthermore, by looking at the time it took respondents to answer the evaluations ques-
tions, I found evidence that respondents do experience significant cross-pressures from their
partisan identity and partisan stereotypes under hypothesized conditions. The timing find-
ings are in conflict with the finding that respondents in the sample do not appear to hold
partisan stereotypes predicted by previous literature (which implies that they do not experi-
ence cross-pressures under hypothesized scenarios). It is noteworthy that the timing results
provide us with an implicit measure of whether respondents experience cross-pressures, while
the results for perception of partisan traits (since they rely on self-reports) provide us with
an explicit measure. Given that explicit measures are known to be subject to misreporting,
this discrepancy in results could be due to respondents not reporting their true perceptions
of partisan traits (Rudman 2004).
Moreover, there are a few additional plausible explanations for surprising results for re-
spondents’ perception of partisan traits. It could be that political science college students,
or college students in general are inclined to give more favorable ratings to Democrats on all
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traits that were examined. That is, on average, college students could have a more positive
opinion of Democrats, than the general population. Alternatively, political events at the
time the survey was conducted could have affected these results. In particular, the survey
was conducted in the Spring of 2016 when Donald Trump was a front runner for the Re-
publican nomination. This also could have influenced students ratings for both Republicans
and Democrats. Specifically, if students’ opinion of Trump is mostly negative then it’s pos-
sible that it could have spill-over effects on their evaluations of Republicans (more negative
ratings), and Democrats (more favorable ratings). Finally, as previously mentioned, it could
be that partisan stereotypes are held for elected officials, and are not applied to ordinary
individuals.
Most of the results suggest that both partisan identity and partisan stereotypes can affect
the evaluations of people. Hence, potentially both of these factors can affect the distribution
of resources for ordinary, non-elected individuals. It’s likely that a larger, more representative
sample of the general population would result in a different conclusion for perception of
traits among respondents, and more significant results for the way that partisan identity
and partisan stereotypes bias evaluations. Hence, further examination is warranted. In
particular, the survey experiment could be repeated on a bigger, nationally representative
sample.
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